International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A New Challenge to the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States? by Morgan, D. Kirk, II
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 50 
Issue 1 Fall 2000 Article 10 
2000 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A New 
Challenge to the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in the 
United States? 
D. Kirk Morgan II 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
D. Kirk Morgan II, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A New Challenge to the Legality of 
the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States?, 50 Cath. U. L. Rev. 143 (2001). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss1/10 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: A NEW CHALLENGE
TO THE LEGALITY OF THE JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES?
D. Kirk Morgan I1
The Eighth Amendment protects citizens of the United States from
"cruel and unusual" punishments.' The scope of this protection, how-
ever, has been ambiguous2 and ultimately dependent upon the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Amendment's language.3 To those who ar-
gue that concrete universal standards are needed to protect human
rights, interpretations of the Eighth Amendment have been unduly def-
erential to the judgments of legislatures. To highlight the purported in-
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In short, "[w]hile the state has the power to punish,
the [Eighth] Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1957). The prohibitions on "cruel
and unusual" punishments appear in Anglo-American jurisprudence as far back as the
1042 laws of Edward the Confessor. Recent Cases, 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135 (1950). In
addition to appearing in the Magna Carta and English Declaration of Rights of 1688, the
laws of many American colonies codified the prohibition before the Framers included it in
the Constitution. See id.
2. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) ("Difficulty would attend
the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which pro-
vides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted."); see also, e.g., Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) ("The authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a
categorical prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they
made no attempt to define the contours.").
3. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (stating that the authors of the Eighth Amend-
ment "delegated" the contours of the Eighth Amendment to "future generations of
judges"); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910) (declaring that it is
the duty of the Court to determine the scope of the Eighth Amendment because "[w]hat
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment [prohibited by the Eighth Amendment] has
not been exactly decided").
4. See Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty
for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1327 (1993) ("The Court should not be so willing to
defer to the preferences of legislatures in analyzing cases under the Eighth Amend-
ment."); Elisabeth Gasparini, Juvenile Capital Punishment: A Spectacle of a Child's Injus-
tice, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1073, 1084 (1998) (arguing that reliance upon state legislatures to de-
termine the scope of the Eighth Amendment has lead to uncertain standards); cf James
H. Wyman, Comment, The Vengeance is Whose?: The Death Penalty and Cultural Relava-
tism in International Law, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 543, 552-53 & n.77 (1997) (sug-
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adequacies of the Amendment's protection, many have pointed to the
legality of capital punishment for juvenile offenders in the United States
With the globalization of human rights law6 and the arguable develop-
ment of international opposition to the death penalty,7 many death pen-
alty opponents now argue that there are new opportunities available in
the fight against capital punishment.8 Although the Eighth Amendment
gesting that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Eighth Amendment have inappro-
priately reflected changes in public opinion).
5. See, e.g., Sherri Jackson, Note, Too Young to Die-Juveniles and the Death Pen-
alty-A Better Alternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391, 409 & n.122 (1996) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 388 n.4 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), which provides a thorough list of the
legal, political, religious, academic, and international groups that have expressed opposi-
tion to the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty).
6. See generally Jerome J. Shestack, Globalization of Human Rights Law, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 558, 559 (1997) (revealing that prior to World War II, "the law of
international human rights was essentially non-existent"). Since World War II, however,
many significant human rights treaties have created tangible sources of international law.
See id. at 559-60. These sources include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Treaty on Civil and Political Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Interna-
tional Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture),
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See id. In addition to these
treaties, "there has been a dramatic increase in the number of U.N. 'organs' devoted pri-
marily to human rights matters, as well as a major increase in the time allocated by some
of the existing organs to the human rights component of their mandates." Prakash Shah,
International Human Rights: A Perspective from India, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 24, 25
(1997).
7. See Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty (last modified
Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.amnesty.org/alib/intcam/dp/dpfacts.htm> (explaining that
since 1976 "[m]ore than two countries a year on average have abolished the death pen-
alty"). Amnesty International asserts that 105 nations have taken a stand against the
death penalty in either law or practice, while only 90 nations retain the death penalty. See
id. As of 1990, only six nations have permitted the execution of minors: Iran, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. See id.
8. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277,
323 (1995) [hereinafter Schabas, Invalid Reservations] (arguing that the United States's
juvenile death practices violate its commitments under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights); William Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 814 (1998) [hereinafter Schabas, International
Law] (arguing that there is strong evidence indicating that international customary norms
should prohibit the use of the death penalty in the United States); Lisa Kline Arnett,
Comment, Death at an Early Age: International Law Arguments Against the Death Penalty
for Juveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 245, 255 (1988) (suggesting that international disfavor of
the juvenile death penalty should be incorporated into the federal common law); see also,
e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1993) [hereinafter SCHABAS, ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
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has traditionally been unsympathetic to the abolitionist cause,' a growing
body of case law suggests that a more developed body of international
law may now offer protections beyond those of the Amendment. '° The
recently decided Domingues v. Nevada" was the first case to present this
argument to an American court."
Domingues involved a 1996 death sentence given to Michael Domin-
gues for crimes he committed at the age of sixteen. 3 Domingues ap-
pealed his sentence for an array of reasons, all of which the Nevada Su-
preme Court unanimously rejected. 4 Domingues followed this appeal,
PENALTY]. Schabas notes that international arguments against the death penalty could
not exist fifty years ago because the "subject matter did not exist." Id. at 1. Schabas goes
on to argue that evolving norms in international law show "an inexorable progress towards
abolition." Id. at 18; see generally Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a United
States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F. L.
REV. 735 (1998) (arguing that the United States is bound by international treaty law to
abstain from executing minors).
9. At one time, however, it appeared as if the Eighth Amendment would be used to
prohibit capital punishment in the United States. See Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of
Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (noting that each Justice
handed down his own opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and concluding
that the death penalty may become completely unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment).
10. See Pressley v. Alabama, No. 1981061, 2000 WL 356347, at *7-*9 (Ala. Apr. 7,
2000) (Houston, J., concurring) (drawing attention to the possibility that the ICCPR might
prohibit Alabama from executing minors); Burgess v. Alabama, No. 1980810, 2000 WL
92254, at *7-*9 (Ala. Jan. 28, 2000) (Houston, J., concurring) (submitting that "I am not
persuaded that the Senate's resolution removes the ICCPR [juvenile death penalty] pro-
hibition in State courts"); Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Nev. 1998) (Rose,
J., dissenting) (positing that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may
forbid Nevada from executing minors), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 396 (1999).
11. 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998) (holding that Nevada's juvenile death penalty is not
unconstitutional despite the United States's ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 396 (1999).
12. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Domingues v. Nevada,
102 S. Ct. 396 (1999) (No. 98-8327) (pointing out that American courts have had no occa-
sion to determine whether customary international law may preempt a state's criminal
punishment "that is not otherwise subject to attack as conflicting with the responsibilities
of the National Government or a source of federal law").
13. Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1280; Domingues v. Nevada, 917 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev.
1996). On October 22, 1993, Domingues broke into the house of Arjin Chanel Pechpo.
See id. at 1369. When Pechpo and her four-year-old son entered the house, Domingues
strangled Pechpo with a cord. See id. Domingues then dragged Pechpo's body into her
tub, filled it with water, and ordered Pechpo's four-year-old son to get in the tub with his
dead mother. See id. When the son complied, Domingues attempted to electrocute the
boy by throwing a hair dryer into the tub; however, when this failed, Domingues stabbed
the four-year-old to death. See id. Domingues's accomplice and friend later explained
that Domingues committed the crime because Pechpo had yelled at Domingues's girl-
friend days earlier. See id.
14. See generally Domingues, 917 P.2d at 1370-78. Domingues argued that the death
sentence handed down by the district court was invalid due to trial errors concerning cer-
20001
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however, with a separate appeal for the correction of an illegal sen-
tence.' 5 Under this second appeal, Domingues argued that the United
States is forbidden to permit the execution of minors due to its ratifica-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR
or Covenant) in 1992.16 Domingues further argued that U.S. death pen-
alty laws violate jus cogens7 and customary international law. 8 In a 3-2
split, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
Domingues's appeal. 9
Unlike prior death penalty arguments that have drawn attention to in-
tain testimony, the admission of certain evidence, the content of jury instructions, and the
harshness of the sentence. See id. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected these arguments
and held that Domingues was "fairly tried, convicted and sentenced." Id. at 1378.
15. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279.
16. See id. Article 6 of the ICCPR declares that the "[s]entence of death shall not be
imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age and shall not be carried
out on pregnant women." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, art. 6, para. 5,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (hereinafter ICCPR].
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1986) (defining jls cogens as a rule of international law that is "recognized
by community of states as preemptory" and "permitting no derogation"); see also de la
Vega & Brown, supra note 8, at 759-62 (suggesting that the prohibition on the execution
of minors has achieved jus cogens status, and thus binds the United States).
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1986) (defining international customary law as law that results from the
"general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obliga-
tion"); see also Arnett, supra note 8, at 257-60 (1988) (arguing that international custom-
ary law should supersede state law).
19. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279, 1280. The Domingues court concluded that the
Senate's express reservation to the ICCPR's death penalty provision was sufficient to up-
hold the legitimacy of Nevada's death penalty laws. Id. at 1280. Speaking for the court,
Justice Young noted that other state laws permitting the execution of juvenile offenders
have continually withstood constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 1279, 1280. Accordingly, Jus-
tice Young concluded that Domingues's death sentence does not violate any U.S. treaty
commitments. See id. Chief Justice Springer, however, dissented and pointed out the
seeming absurdity of the United States being a party to a treaty while "rejecting one of its
most vital terms." Id. at 1280 (Springer, C.J., dissenting). Based on this apparent conflict,
and the idea that condoning the death penalty for juvenile offenders puts the United
States in the company of "Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Pakistan," Chief Justice
Springer withheld his approval of the majority opinion. Id. at 1281 (Springer, C.J., dis-
senting). Justice Rose, in a separate dissent, drew attention to the unsettled nature of the
questions posed to the court. See id. at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting). Justice Rose argued
that the "penultimate issue" in need of resolution was the question of "whether the Sen-
ate's reservation was valid." Id. (Rose, J., dissenting). After drawing attention to sources
that seemed to indicate that the United States may have made invalid reservations, Justice
Rose asserted that if these sources are accurate, the next question should be whether the
United States is still a party to the treaty. See id. (Rose, J., dissenting). Justice Rose con-
cluded that the fact-specific details relevant to this question should be resolved on remand
to the district court where a "full hearing on the effect of the ICCPR" could be held. Id.
(Rose, J., dissenting).
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ternational law,2° Domingues's appeal argued that international law is
more than a mere interpretive tool for the Eighth Amendment.1 In ef-
fect, Domingues argued that the ICCPR offers protections beyond those
contained in the Constitution.22 Although the United States ratified the
ICCPR expressing its intent not to be bound by provisions at odds with
its own death penalty practices, 23 Domingues argued that international
law has shown these reservations to be invalid.24 As a result, Domingues
argued that the United States is bound without exception to all ICCPR
provisions.25 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case is the atten-
tion that it draws to the unsettled gray area surrounding the United
26States's death penalty laws and its international treaty commitments.
This Comment explores the questions of international treaty law that
Domingues raises; it does not express a view on whether U.S. juvenile
death penalty practices are sound public policy. Rather, this Comment
examines whether international treaty law mandates a change in the
status of the death penalty in the United States. This Comment first ex-
20. See discussion infra Part I.A-B (discussing Supreme Court cases dealing with this
issue); see generally Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using Inter-
national Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1195 (1987) (describing how international standards have been used to define the scope of
certain protections in the U.S. Constitution).
21. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279, petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S.
Nov. 1, 1999) (No. 98-8327) (maintaining that international law forbids Nevada from exe-
cuting juvenile offenders).
22. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Domingues v. Nevada, 102
S. Ct. 398 (1999) (No. 98-8327). Domingues argued that:
[E]ven if the Senate's reservation to Article 6(5) is valid as a matter of United
States constitutional law, it is not valid as a matter of the international law of
treaties, and so the United States must be deemed to have accepted all of Article
6(5) without reservation, including the prohibition against capital punishment for
offenders under 18 years of age.
Id.
23. See United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Jan. 30, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 646 [hereinaf-
ter Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations]. The U.S. reservation to Article 6 states that it:
"reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment
on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws
permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such crimes committed by per-
sons below 18 years of age." Id.
24. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Nevada Supreme Court at 26, Domin-
gues (No. 98-8327) (1999) (stating that the U.S. death penalty reservations are invalid be-
cause they violate the "object and purpose" of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
25. See id.
26. See Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1281 (Rose, J., dissenting) (opining that the issues
raised in Domingues highlight many unsettled and complicated international matters that
might potentially affect the legality of the juvenile death penalty in the United States).
2000]
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amines how international laws and standards have been used in previous
Supreme Court rulings on the death penalty. This Comment then seeks
to determine under what frameworks, and by whose authority, the valid-
ity of U.S. reservations to the ICCPR should be examined. This Com-
ment concludes that there is insufficient authority to rule that the United
States's reservations are invalid. This Comment also notes that even if
the United States made an invalid reservation, it did not consent to the
entire ICCPR; accordingly, American courts should not bind the country
to provisions to which it has explicitly withheld consent.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS USE IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
INTERPRETATION
Despite the considerable amount of public discourse now surrounding
the death penalty, the Supreme Court did not refer to the Eighth
Amendment until 1867.27 Since that time, the role of international law
has had varying influence on the Court's interpretation of the Amend-
ment.
28
A. Trop v. Dulles-Opening the Constitutional Gateway to International
Ideas on the Meaning of "Cruel and Unusual"
In Trop v. Dulles,29 the Supreme Court addressed an American's claim
that he was unconstitutionally denied admittance into the United States
because he had deserted his U.S. Army company during wartime.0 Con-
sidering whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited this expulsion, the
Court referred to "evolving standards of decency."31 The Court gauged
these standards by pointing out that expelling the petitioner for his de-
27. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY As CRUEL TREATMENT AND
TORTURE 21 (1996) (revealing that the first case to address the Eighth Amendment was
Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 479-80 (1866)). In part, Pervear discussed whether
the Eighth Amendment applied to state governments. Pervear, 5 Wall. at 476. The Court
ruled that the Eighth Amendment applies only to federal actions, but that even if the
Amendment were to apply to state actions, it would not bar a state from fining and sen-
tencing a person to three months of hard labor for violating a state statute forbidding the
"keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors." Id.
28. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 & n.1 (1989) (declaring that
international standards are irrelevant to the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment), with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 & n.31
(1988) (considering international death penalty standards as evidence against the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment).
29. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (ruling that under the Eighth Amendment, the U.S. govern-
ment cannot expel a citizen for deserting his military company in wartime).
30.. See id. at 87.
31. Id. at 101.
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sertion would result in "a condition deplored in the international com-
munity of democracies. 32 The Court further noted that a "United Na-
tions' survey of the nationality laws of eighty-four nations of the world
reveals that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose de-
nationalization as a penalty for desertion."33 Based in part on these in-
ternational factors, the Court ruled that expulsion for military desertion
contravened modern standards of decency, and thus violated Eighth
Amendment protections.34
Indicative of the Court's acceptance of international law as an inter-
pretive tool for the Eighth Amendment, the dissent in Trop did not ob-
ject to the majority's reliance on international standards.35 In fact, the
dissent argued that had the majority considered all relevant international
law, a more limited idea of Eighth Amendment protections would have
36emerged.
The Court again employed international standards to broaden the pro-
tections of the Eighth Amendment in Coker v. Georgia.37 In Coker, the
Court observed that "in the light of the legislative decisions in almost all
of the States and in most of the countries around the world, it would be
difficult to support a claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispen-
sable part of [Georgia's] criminal justice system." '38 Defending its use of
international standards, the Court asserted that "the climate of interna-
tional opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment" is
particularly relevant to decisions about the scope of the Eighth Amend-
ment. 9 The Court eventually rejected the relevancy of international law,
however, when it considered the constitutionality of executing persons
for crimes committed as minors.0
32. Id. at 102.
33. Id. at 103.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 114, 125-28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[mjany civilized nations
impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited activities").
37. 433 U.S. 584, 592 & n.4,593,596 (1977).
38. Id. at 592 n.4.
39. Id. at 596 n.10. At the time of the decision, only three of sixty surveyed nations
retained the death penalty for rapists. See id.
40. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 & n.1, 380 (1989) (ruling that the
Constitution does not prohibit the execution of 16 or 17 year-old juvenile offenders and
declaring that the "sentencing practices of other countries" are irrelevant factors to a
proper constitutional analysis).
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B. Thompson and Stanford: The Rise and Demise of International
Standards in Eighth Amendment Analysis
In Thompson v. Oklahoma," the Supreme Court held that the execu-
tion of criminals for crimes they committed at age fifteen violates the
Eighth Amendment.42 The Court noted that its holding "is consistent
with the views that have been expressed by ... other nations that share
our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the West-
ern European community."43  In her concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor also reasoned that because the "United States has agreed by
treaty to set a minimum age of [eighteen] for capital punishment in cer-
tain circumstances," it is evident that evolving standards of decency op-
pose the application of the death penalty to minors.44
The dissent in Thompson particularly criticized the majority's use of
international law.45 Led by Justice Scalia, the dissent maintained that the
"views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court
may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution.' '  This sentiment soon resurfaced in Stanford v. Ken-
47 . 481tucky, though this time in the majority opinion.
In Stanford, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" does not bar the
execution of offenders who were sixteen when they committed their
crimes. 49 The majority narrowed the Trop modern standards of decency
test to focus solely on evolving standards of decency in American soci-
41. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
42. See id. at 838.
43. Id. at 830.
44. Id. at 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to Article 68 of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which restricts the
use of the death penalty on minors who are captured in war).
45. See id. at 864-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White joined Justice Scalia's dissent. See id. at 859.
46. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
48. See generally id.
49. Id. at 380. The Court recognized two potential grounds for determining whether
a penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 368-69. In addition to considering
the "'evolving standards of decency,"' the Court also considered whether the execution of
minors would have been "'considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights
was adopted."' Id. at 368-69 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion) and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). Although the petitioners in
Stanford did not appeal on this ground, the Court signaled that had such an appeal been
made, it would have been irrelevant due to the overwhelming consensus that the execution
of juvenile offenders at the time of the Bill of Rights was not considered cruel or unusual.
Id. at 368.
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ety.50 When deciphering these American standards, the majority argued
that only objective evidence should be considered. 1 Upon the assump-
tion that patterns of state and federal laws were the "primary and most
reliable" sources of objective evidence, the majority ruled that the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders complied with evolving American standards of
justice.52
The dissent in Stanford criticized the majority for not using the "more
searching inquiry ... mandated by [its] precedents interpreting the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause., 53 Furthering this sentiment, the dis-
sent faulted the majority for not considering the legislation and treaties
of other countries to gauge evolving standards of decency.54 The dissent,
however, stopped short of suggesting that any international law or treaty
superseded a state's right to execute juvenile offenders.55 Instead, the
dissent argued that the world community's disapproval of the death pen-
alty is one of the many reasons to conclude that capital punishment for
16youth offenders is unconstitutional .
50. See id. at 369 & n.1. The Court emphasized that "it is American conceptions of
decency that are dispositive" in determining the scope of Eighth Amendment protections.
Id. at 369 & n.1.
51. See id. at 369. In ascertaining what constituted objective evidence, Justice Scalia
dismissed the relevancy of "public opinion polls, the views of interest groups, and the posi-
tions adopted by various professional associations" as "uncertain foundations." Id. at 377.
52. Id. at 373. When deciding whether norms expressed by state legislatures are per-
vasive enough to qualify as evolving American standards of decency, Justice Scalia looked
to previous case law. See id. at 369-72. Relevant case law cited by Justice Scalia included:
Enmund v Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982), which struck down capital punishment for
accomplices to robberies where murder occurs because at the time only eight other juris-
dictions would have permitted such a penalty; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408
(1986), which held that a state's execution of an insane person required an adequate
hearing on the issue of insanity because no other state allowed such an execution without
a hearing; and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983), which overruled a state's life sen-
tence without parole statute because it was more severe than the statutes of any other
state. See id. at 371. At the time of Stanford, the majority of states with the death penalty
permitted the execution of juvenile offenders. See id.
53. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Brennan criticized the
majority for only considering a "narrow range of factors as determinative of ... whether a
punishment violates the Constitution because it is excessive." Id. at 391. Justice Black-
mun, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens all joined Justice Brennan's dissent. See id. at
382.
54. See id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Trop as one case that used interna-
tional standards to determine the scope of the Eighth Amendment).
55. See id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also considered the fact that
the majority of U.S. states and "respected organizations" reject the death penalty for mi-
nors. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(ICCPR): GROUNDS FOR A POSITIVIST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE
DEATH PENALTY FOR MINORS?
To some, Stanford captures the way in which positivism has affected
the interpretation and formation of American law. Others have also
pointed out that positivism has changed the way that international law is
formed." Instead of developing international law through unwritten cus-
toms, common law, and reference to natural laws, states have constructed
concrete treaties and agreements to bind fellow nations." Unlike argu-
ments that appeal to uncodified international standards, treaties such as
the ICCPR potentially allow for positivist arguments against the legality
of the United States's juvenile death penalty laws."'
A. The Formation of the ICCPR
The ICCPR is one of three documents intended to comprise the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights (IBHR).6' An American-led United Na-
57. See, e.g., Licia A. Esposito, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile and
Menatally Retarded Offenders: A Precedential Analysis and Proposal for Reconsideration,
31 B.C. L. REV. 901, 961 (criticizing the Supreme Court's positivist approach in Stanford
and other Eighth Amendment cases); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of
Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1357 n.127 (1990) (describing Stanford as a decision
that exemplifies the positivism of Justice Scalia and other members of the current Su-
preme Court).
58. See, e.g., Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights
Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 148
(1996). Loschin states that:
The trend toward positivist preferences for the formation of international law has
changed the way international law is formed. Instead of developing custom
through practice over decades or centuries, modern international bodies develop
and adopt multilateral conventions on topics of international concern. This is
particularly true in the realm of human rights.
Id. at 148.
59. See id.; see also Shestack, supra note 6, at 559-60 (providing a list of recent trea-
ties and international agreements evidencing a new focus in the human rights movement).
60. See Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could
Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 435-36 (1997) (arguing that treaty law directly
binds the United States to comply with many international human rights standards-in-
cluding the ban on the juvenile death penalty); see also Schabas, Invalid Reservations, su-
pra note 8, at 324 (suggesting that recent judgments by the European Court indicate that
the United States may be bound by the entire ICCPR-including the Covenant's prohibi-
tion on the juvenile death penalty-despite the United States's reservations).
61. See, e.g., Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Rati-
fication of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights
Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1993). The International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights are the two other documents that comprised the IBHR. See id. at 1211.
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tions put forth the idea of the IBHR as a means to impart human rights
standards in former Axis countries.62 As originally planned, the IBHR
sought to espouse ideas around the world similar to those found in the
American Bill of Rights. 3  Despite the United States's influence, the
ICCPR did not fully conform to the U.S. Constitution when the United
Nations adopted it in 1966.64
B. The Content of the ICCPR
The ICCPR consists of forty-seven articles that are designed to pro-
tect:
[L]ife, integrity, liberty and security of the human person; the
rights with respect to the administration of justice; the right to
privacy; the rights to freedom of religion or belief and to free-
dom of opinion and expression; freedom of movement; the right
to assembly and association; and the right to political participa-
tion.65
The treaty lists five basic control mechanisms to encourage compliance;"
62. See id. (connecting U.S. efforts to impart human rights standards in Axis coun-
tries with President Roosevelt's plans to establish the "Four Freedoms" worldwide).
Though the ICCPR was originally planned to instill human rights in Axis countries, the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee ratified the Covenant with the hope of promoting
"democratic values and the rule of law, not only in Eastern Europe and the successor
states of the Soviet Union but also ... in Africa and Asia." Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, supra note 23, at 649.
63. See, e.g., Anthony Lester QC, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 539 (1988) (describing how the United States and its Bill of
Rights exerted significant influence on the development of the United Nations Covenant
on Human Rights).
64. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 23, at 648, 650 (reporting that
the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the ICCPR on December 16,
1966). Although most of the Covenant's provisions are compatible with U.S. law, diver-
gence still exists. For example, Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to free
speech and expression, yet allows states to restrict this right in order to protect national
security and stop the spread of racial and religious hatred. Id. The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations declared these exceptions as inconsistent with the free speech guaran-
tees of the U.S. Constitution. See id.
65. Ann Fagan Ginger, The Energizing Effect on Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1341, 1358 (1993) (quoting Theo Van Boven, The International Sys-
tem of Human Rights: An Overview, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING at 4,
U.N. Doc. AR/Pub/91/1, U.N. Sales No. E.91. xiv.1 (1991)).
66. See generally id. at 1358-72 (noting that compliance is monitored through the use
of five reporting functions that must be performed by contracting parties to the ICCPR).
Parties to the ICCPR must: (1) familiarize those domestic authorities responsible for en-
forcing the ICCPR with the treaty's requirements; (2) report to the Human Rights Com-
mittee about the progress made in enforcing the treaty; (3) detail any problems with the
implementation of ICCPR standards; (4) provide representatives to answer questions on
submitted reports; and (5) submit reports on problems and implementation in five-year
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apart from these mechanisms, each state has an underlying duty to rec-
ognize the rights recognized in the ICCPR.67
C. United States's Ratification of the ICCPR
The United States did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992.68 Although
President Carter signed the Covenant in 1977 and sent it to the Senate
for consent and ratification in 1978, the Senate did not act on the treaty
during the Carter and Reagan administrations.69 Upon the urging of
President Bush, however, the Senate ratified the treaty in 1992.70 The
Senate qualified its signature with the significant and controversial "res-
ervations, 71 "declarations, 72 and "understanding[s], 73 suggested by the
intervals. See id. at 1358-59.
67. Id. at 1359.
68. See Posner & Spiro, supra note 61, at 1209. The former Executive Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union noted that:
One reason that it took so long for the United States to become a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... is that ratification never
became an important issue on the agenda of the many organizations devoted to
the protection of civil rights and civil liberties within the United States.
Areh Neier, Political Consequences of the United States Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1233, 1233 (1993). Neier at-
tributes this lack of interest to "the view that the protection of liberty within the United
States would not be noticeably affected by international agreements, regardless of whether
the United States became a party to them." Id.
69. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 23, at 649 (pointing out that al-
though President Carter transmitted the Covenant to the Senate during his term, the So-
viet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis preoccupied the Committee). The
Committee also noted that President Reagan "did not indicate any interest in ratifying the
Covenant." Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 646. The United States attached a total of five reservations to the ICCPR.
See id. The United States attached reservations to: Article 20, which restricts speech in
circumstances not proscribed by the First Amendment; Article 6, which prohibits the exe-
cution of minors; Article 7, which potentially provides protections beyond the 5th, 8th, and
14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article 15, paragraph 1, which requires that
subsequently enacted sentencing laws be applied retroactively if they are favorable to of-
fenders; and Article 10, paragraphs 2(b) and 3, which require the penal separation of
adults and juveniles. See id. A reservation is defined as "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or ac-
ceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, para. 1(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
72. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 23, at 646-47. The United States
attached a total of four declarations. See id. The first declaration states that rights and
prohibitions of articles 1-27 are not self-executing. See id. The second declaration urged
parties to the ICCPR to refrain from enacting limitations on speech. See id. The third
declaration recognized the competence of the Human Rights Committee. See id. The
fourth declaration stated that other international principles may restrict the rights recog-
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Bush administration.74
D. The Response to United States's Ratification of the ICCPR
The Senate reservations to the ICCPR exempted the United States
from the treaty's enforcement methods, as well as specific ICCPR provi-
sions, including the ban on the juvenile death penalty.75 Human rights16 7
groups, U.N. bodies,7 and other nations' have criticized the unique res-
ervations.7 9 Criticisms focus on the idea that although the ICCPR pur-
nized in the ICCPR. See id.
73. Id. at 646. The United States articulated five understandings. See id. The first
understanding clarified that the United States did not interpret age discrimination to be
against the Covenant. See id. The second stated that the right to seek compensation for
illegal arrest would not be interpreted as the right to receive compensation. See id. The
third stated that the accused need not always be separated from the convicted. See id.
The fourth stated that indigents are guaranteed counsel, but not choice of counsel. See id.
The fifth stated that principles of Federalism prevented the United States from fully com-
plying with the treaty at the state and local levels. See id.
74. See id. at 649 (attributing the conditions placed upon the United States ratifica-
tion of ICCPR to proposals put forth by President George Bush). It should be noted that
the United States did not attach reservations to all parts of the Covenant that differed or
went beyond the protections of the Constitution. See Neier, supra note 68, at 1237 (listing
11 parts of the ICCPR that go beyond the protections of the U.S. Constitution, but were
not objected to in the Senate's ratification of the Covenant).
75. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (describing the United States's res-
ervations, declarations, and understandings). The United States stated that it was neces-
sary to attach reservations, understandings, and declarations "in order to ensure that the
United States can fulfill its obligations under the Covenant in a manner consistent with the
U.S. Constitution." Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 23, at 653.
76. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Domingues v. Nevada,
102 S. Ct. 396 (1998) (No. 98-8327) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae], which was filed on
behalf of the Human Rights Advocates and the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights;
see also Jackson, supra note 5, at 409 & n.122 (discussing the array of organizations that
have voiced opposition to U.S. death penalty practices).
77. See Human Rights Committee Concludes Consideration of Initial Report of the
United States, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1406th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. HR/CT/405
(1995), available in <gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/uncurr/press-releases/HR/CT/95-
03/405> (stating that the U.S. reservation to Article 6 is contrary to the object and purpose
of the Covenant).
78. See Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Note, The Death Penalty Reservation to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible Sys-
tem Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69, 72 & n.15 (1994) (noting that the
Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain
objected to the United States's reservations on the ground that the reservations were in-
compatible with the ICCPR's object and purpose).
79. See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights: The Significance of Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1192 (1993) (noting that although over 40 other parties to the
Covenant accompanied their ratifications with reservations, the United States is one of
three nations to attach a reservation to Article 6, which prohibits the execution of juvenile
offenders). Only Ireland and the Netherlands also attached reservations to article 60. See
2000]
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portedly advances human rights,8° the attached reservations disregard the
very essence of the treaty.'
Some argue that reservations to any human rights treaty are unsatisfac-
tory because "the incentive for states to change their domestic policies to
conform with international human rights standards is removed, ulti-
mately resulting in the loss of the standard's legitimacy."'82 To guard the
legitimacy of human rights standards, these critics and others suggest that
despite Senate reservations, the United States should be bound by the
entire ICCPR.83
III. THE DIFFICULT TASK OF DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF THE
UNITED STATES'S RESERVATIONS TO THE ICCPR
Traditionally, a state's reservation to a treaty was valid only if all other
treaty members unanimously approved of the reservation. 84 Today, how-
Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 291.
80. See ICCPR, supra note 16, at 171 (characterizing the Covenant as promoting "the
inherent dignity and .. .the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family").
81. See generally G. Fitzmaurice, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 2 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 1 (1953) (arguing that reservations defeat the objective of treaties because
states may tailor their acceptances in ways that do not compel them to enact any meaning-
ful change in policy); see also Loschin, supra note 58, at 148 ("The availability of reserva-
tions and understandings has undercut the goal of creating truly universal law."). But see
Daniel N. Hylton, Note, Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, Inadequate Framework on Reservations, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419, 428 (1994)
(illustrating, though not supporting, the idea that a system of reservations, as opposed to
the unanimity rule, protects the right of a sovereign state to avoid compromising its
power).
82. Sherman, supra note 78, at 71. Others have noted that the United States should
not be considered a genuine human rights leader until it removes its reservations to the
ICCPR. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
1169,1171 (1993).
83. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76, at 89 (arguing that U.S. reserva-
tions to the ICCPR do not excuse the country from its obligation to comply with all of the
ICCPR provisions); see also, e.g., Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 324
(pointing to international sources of law to suggest that "the United States is bound at law
by the Covenant as a whole").
84. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 31-34 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Convention
Case] (Guerrero, McNair, Read, Mo, J.J., dissenting) (supporting their objections to the
flexible reservation system by citing a variety of traditional sources in international law
that have recognized the unanimity rule); ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES, BRITISH PRACTICE AND OPINIONS 106 (1938) (stating the importance of all
parties to a treaty assenting to a reservation before the reservation is acceptable). For a
thorough description of the history of the unanimity rule, see Belinda Clark, The Vienna
Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 289, 291 (1991). Clark notes that some sources have exaggerated
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ever, international standards recognize methods by which reservations
may become valid without the unanimous approval of all treaty mem-
bers.85 The ICCPR does not address the permissibility of reservations,
and consequently, the Covenant itself offers no guidance to states seek-
ing to evaluate the legitimacy of the United States's reservations." Be-
cause international customary law tends to lack predictability,87 the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties is generally accepted as the
88
most relevant authority on the validity of reservations. Whether the
Vienna Convention truly provides any more certainty than international
customary law is debatable.89
the role of the unanimity rule in traditional treaty law, overlooking that the idea was never
truly accepted as international law in the Americas or Eastern Europe. See id. at 291.
85. See Clark, supra note 84, at 289 (discussing how a "flexible approach" emerged as
a trend in international treaty making). The unanimity rule may have officially faded
when the International Court of Justice, addressing a reservation to the Genocide Con-
vention in an advisory opinion, declared that in the interest of wide participation, a flexi-
ble approach to treaty making is appropriate. See generally Genocide Convention Case,
supra note 84, at 15-30. The United Nations General Assembly eventually adopted the
position of the International Court of Justice when it affirmed the use of a flexible ap-
proach to treaty making in the Vienna Convention. See Sherman, supra note 78, at 77.
86. See General Comment No. 24 (52) Relating to Reservations, U.N. GAOR Hum.
Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 24 (52)] ("The Covenant neither prohibits reservations nor mentions any
type of permitted reservation.").
87. See Glaniville L. Williams, Ph.D, International Law and the Controversy Con-
cerning the Word "Law," 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1945) (explaining how international
common law often encompasses varying and even opposing standards because there is no
structured authority or comprehensive body of case law); see also Lauren B. Kallins,
Comment, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Is the United States in Contravention of Interna-
tional Law?, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 77, 93 (1993) (arguing that customary interna-
tional law is difficult to define, in part because it is "an area of law based not on principles
which have been studied, debated, clearly articulated and ultimately adopted by member
States"); Sherman, supra note 78, at 71 (arguing that customary international law and the
rules governing treaty-making "are unclear" and thus "almost invariably give way to po-
litical considerations"). Sherman also notes that "it is not always clear which practices
create rules of customary international law." Id. at 85.
88. See General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, at 465 ("[Tlhe absence of a
prohibition on reservations does not mean that any reservation is permitted ... [as] the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties provides relevant guidance."). During a
United Nations conference on the law of treaties, the Legal Advisor to the State Depart-
ment declared that the United States "consistently applied" the terms of the Vienna Con-
vention "which constitute a codification of customary international law." Marian L. Nash,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L
L. 142, 147 (1981) (citing Commentary of the International Law Commission, United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of Treaties A/Conf.39/11/Add.2, at 38 (1971)). It should also
be pointed out, however, that although the U.S. government has recognized the stature of
the Convention, the Senate has not ratified it. See id.
89. See Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 495, 509 (1970) (describing how conference attendees failed to agree on a reserva-
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A. The Vienna Convention and the Ambiguity Surrounding the Validity
of Reservations
The Vienna Convention is the product of the United Nations' attempt
to codify the law of treaties-essentially the treaty on treaties.9° As such,
the Vienna Convention "purports to constitute a comprehensive set of
principles and rules governing all the most significant aspects of the law
of treaties.""
Under the Vienna Convention, reservations to treaties are permissible
unless the treaty expressly prohibits the reservations92 or if such reserva-
tions contravene the treaty's "object and purpose." 93  Because the
ICCPR does not expressly prohibit reservations,94 the U.S. death penalty
reservation is invalid only if it is contrary to the "object and purpose" of
the ICCPR.9 '
According to the Vienna Convention, individual states must determine
whether the reservations of other states violate the "object and purpose"
of a treaty.96 The problem, however, is that the Vienna Convention does
not provide a methodology or list of factors that should be used to evalu-
ate whether a reservation violates the "object and purpose" of a given
treaty.9 '7 In the case of the ICCPR, this omission is particularly problem-
tion policy, and thus left the issue unsettled); see also Sherman, supra note 78, at 72 (de-
claring that under the Vienna Convention, questions about the legitimacy of reservations
are difficult, contentious, without any guidance, and nearly impossible to resolve).
90. See I.M. SINCLAIR, C.M.G. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 1-6 (1973).
91. Id. at 6.
92. See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, arts. 19(a), (b) (stating that a treaty may
either prohibit all reservations or only reservations to specific provisions). An example of
a treaty that expressly prohibits reservations is Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty. See William Schabas, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for In-
novation and Reform, 32 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 46 (1994) [hereinafter Schabas, Reserva-
tions].
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 19(c) (stating that reservations that are
not expressly prohibited may still be invalidated if they are incompatible with a treaty's
object and purpose).
94. See General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, at 465.
95. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76, at 8.
96. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 21(3) ("When a State objecting to a reser-
vation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving
State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two
States to the extent of the reservation.").
97. Sherman, supra note 78, at 84; see also Hylton, supra note 81, at 430 ("The Vi-
enna Convention addressed all reservations as one class. Article 19(c) created a distinc-
tion only between those reservations that are or are not compatible 'with the object and
purpose of the treaty.' Nowhere in the Convention did the drafters specify the criteria
necessary to determine compatibility."). Surprisingly, or perhaps in recognition of the
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atic because the ICCPR does not explicitly identify its object and pur-
pose.98 Given the lack of guidance available to individual states, the Hu-
man Rights Committee (Committee)99 has suggested that the ambiguity
can be resolved if it assumes the task of providing and interpreting the
standards needed to interpret the Vienna Convention's "object and pur-
pose" language'
B. The Human Rights Committee: Leviathan or Mere Advisor?
Support for the Human Rights Committee's assumption of power
comes from the Committee itself.01 The Committee has declared that
"[i]t necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose" of the ICCPR. °2
Under Article 40 of the ICCPR, the Commission is to receive reports
from state parties that detail the progress that has been made on the im-
plementation of treaty provisions.03 After studying these reports, the
Commission transmits them to other states and attaches whatever gen-
eral comments it considers necessary.104
Article 40 of the ICCPR does not include any provisions that address
the need for the Committee to consider the compatibility of reserva-
Convention's hazy status, in Domingues, the plaintiff's attorneys did not suggest any fac-
tors to be used to ascertain whether U.S. death penalty reservations contravened the
ICCPR's purpose. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 19, Domingues v. Nevada, 120
S. Ct. 396 (1999) (No. 98-8327) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief in Opposition] (drawing
attention to the fact that the petitioner failed "to analyze or even state how a reservation is
determined to be incompatible with the object and purpose [of] a treaty").
98. See generally ICCPR, supra note 16. It should be added that it is common for a
treaty not to present a cohesive package of its objects and purposes. See Schabas, Reser-
vations, supra note 92, at 47 (observing that "it is not normal practice in treaty drafting to
spell out the 'object and purpose' as if one were defining technical terms").
99. See generally ICCPR, supra note 16, arts. 28-45 (describing the composition and
responsibilities of the Committee). The Human Rights Committee is a group of 18 inde-
pendent experts established under Article 28 of the ICCPR to monitor the compliance of
member states. See id. art. 28(1). In Domingues, the defendant's brief appears to argue
that upon the authority and conclusions of the Human Rights Committee, the U.S. reser-
vations are invalid. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76, at 9.
100. General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, para. 8 (discussing the inadequacy
of current treaty law surrounding reservations and plans to use international law to discern
the meaning of the Vienna Convention's "object and purpose" language).
101. See id. para. 18.
102. Id.
103. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40(1). Under Section 40(1)(a) & (b), these reports
must be submitted within one year from the date when the treaty is entered into force, or
whenever the Human Rights Committee requests. See id. The United States, however,
did not submit a report to the Committee until 1995, four years after the United States
ratified the Convention. See Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 278.
104. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40(4).
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tions."'" Nonetheless, according to the Committee, "[i]n order to know
the scope of its duty to examine a State's compliance under Article 40...
the Committee has necessarily to take a view on the compatibility of a
reservation with the object and purpose of the Covenant."' ' Not only
must the Committee take a view, but also, according to the Committee,
the view that it takes must be the definitive authority that prevails over
the determinations of all other treaty parties. °7
According to the United States, the Human Rights Committee's posi-
tion grants powers far more expansive than those granted by the
ICCPR."11 The United States has expressed the view that the ICCPR
"does not impose on States Parties an obligation to give effect to the
Committee's interpretations or confer on the Committee the power to
render definitive or binding interpretations of the Covenant."'' " In addi-
tion to exceeding its grant of power, the United States has also claimed
that the Committee's assertions are contrary to the Vienna Convention
that gave birth to the "object and purpose" standard."0 Even if one as-
sumes that the Human Rights Committee, rather than individual states,
should have the power to rule on the validity of reservations, it is still
necessary to question the Committee's proposed method for determining
105. Id. art. 40.
106. General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, para. 18.
107. See id. para. 17 (stating that the objections or lack of objections by party members
may provide some guidance to the Commission, but alone are insufficient to determine the
validity of a reservation).
108. See Observations by the Governments of the United States and the United King-
dom on General Comments No. 24 (52), 16 HUM. RTS. L.J. 422 1 (1995) [hereinafter Ob-
servations by the Governments] (declaring the Committee's assertion of power to be a
"significant departure from the Covenant scheme"). The United States consented to the
power of the Human Rights Committee "to receive and consider communications under
Article 41 in which a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obliga-
tions under the Covenant." 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2,1992). It should also
be noted that the United States was not alone in its objections to the assumed powers as-
serted by the Human Rights Committee. See Observations by the Governments, supra, at
425. The United Kingdom asserted that even if the Vienna Convention provides an in-
adequate solution to the problem of reservations, "this would not of itself give rise to a
competence or power in the Committee except to the extent provided for in the Cove-
nant." Id. para. 12.
109. Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, § 1. Again, the United King-
dom sided with the United States and stated that "[n]o conclusion as to the status or con-
sequences of a particular reservation" can be determinative without presupposing that
"the Parties had undertaken in proper form a prior legal obligation to accept it." General
Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, at 425 para. 12.
110. Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, § 1 (stating that the Commit-
tee's position is a rejection of "the established rules of interpretation of treaties as set
forth in the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties and in customary international
law").
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the validity of a reservation to the ICCPR."'
C. Using International Customary Norms to Identify the "Object and
Purpose" of the ICCPR
Speaking through the same General Comment that addressed its com-
petency to rule on the validity of a reservation, the Committee asserted
that all treaty provisions that are international norms are also necessarily
related to the ICCPR's purpose and are thus exempt from reservations."'
According to the Committee, a prohibition becomes an international
norm when it is recognized as both "state practice" and "opinio juris."'
The widespread prohibition of an action will evidence state practice."'
For a prohibition to achieve opinio juris status, however, states must not
only prohibit a certain practice; they must prohibit that practice because
they believe it to be against international law."' For example, opinio ju-
ris would not be established if states prohibited a practice because of
domestic concerns.!
6
111. One method that has been suggested, but will not be extensively examined in this
Comment, includes the substantive/non-substantive division. See Schabas, Invalid Reser-
vations, supra note 8, at 291-93. This approach, described by Schabas as the "extreme
view," holds that a reservation to any substantive provision necessarily violates a treaty's
"object and purpose" and thus only procedural provisions may be the subject of reserva-
tion. Id. at 292. A concurring International Court of Justice member in Belilos v. Swit-
zerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) took this view. See id. at 292. State practice, the
decisions of the International Court of Justice, the Human Rights Committee, and the In-
ter-American Commission of Human Rights, however, have all recognized that reserva-
tions to substantive provisions are not per se violations of a treaty's object and purpose.
See id. Because such a strong consensus is well established, the substantive/non-
substantive-position will not be examined in this Comment.
112. General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, paras. 6-8. According to the object
and purpose test of the Vienna Convention, "provisions in the Covenant that represent
customary international law .. may not be the subject of reservations." Id. para 8.
113. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 8, at 756.
114. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1966). To
those who are skeptical of power wielded by the Human Rights Committee, it should be
noted that ascertaining "wide-spread state practice" will necessarily anoint the Committee
with significant discretion. E.g., Kallins, supra note 87, at 93 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, which acknowledges the
difficulty in determining at what point a custom turns into law and the fact that "'there is
no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be"' before it becomes
law).
115. See BROWNLIE, supra note 114, at 7 (pointing out that in order to qualify as
opinio juris, state practice must emanate from a "sense of legal obligation, as opposed to
motives of courtesy, fairness, or morality"). Much like "state practice," determining
opinio juris is a relatively standardless process that will leave the Human Rights Commit-
tee with a significant amount of discretion. Kallins, supra note 87, at 95-96 (indicating that
the "psychological component" makes the opinio juris determination "elusive").
116. See Kallins, supra note 87, at 95-96. Because of this emphasis on the motivations
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If the above analysis were employed, the legitimacy of the U.S. death
penalty reservations would depend on whether Article 6 of the ICCPR,
which prohibits the juvenile death penalty, reiterates principles that are
already recognized as international norms."7 In a context separate from
the question of ICCPR's purpose, Domingues argued this point when he
asserted that Article 6 merely codifies pre-existing international norms.""
The Brief of Amici Curiae filed in support of Domingues argued that
the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty developed into a customary
international norm when the prohibition became both "state practice"
and "opinio juris.""' 9 To evidence state practice, Domingues pointed out
that at the time of his trial only six countries enforced the juvenile death
penalty. 2" The persuasiveness of this figure was certainly bolstered by
the observation that in 1998, when the United States executed three ju-
venile offenders, it was the only state in the world to execute any juvenile
offender.' To evidence opinio juris, Domingues listed numerous inter-
national treaties prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders.'22 Even
behind a state action, opinio juris has been referred to as the "subjective or "psychological
component" of a customary law analysis. Id. Detecting a state's motivation can often be a
difficult and confusing task, and as a result, some have argued that inquiries into the exis-
tence of opiniojuris are destined to be guesswork. See id.
117. See General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, para. 8 (stating that because
tenets of customary international law are exempt from reservations by ICCPR members,
among other things "a State may not reserve the right to... execute pregnant women or
children.") According to the Human Rights Committee, states would violate customary
international law if they reserved the right:
[T]o engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel [and unusual] pun-
ishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and de-
tain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a
person guilty unless he proves his innocence ... to permit the advocacy of na-
tional, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable age the right
to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess
their own religion, or use their own language.
Id.
118. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76, at 11. Domingues argued that aside
from violating the ICCPR, the mere fact that permitting the execution of minors violated
customary international law was sufficient to overturn his sentence. See id. at 11-15.
119. Id. at 13.
120. See, e.g., id. at 11. The fact that only six nations allow the execution of juvenile
offenders apparently weighed heavily on Chief Justice Springer, who specifically men-
tioned this anomaly in his five-four-sentence dissent. See Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d
1279,1280-81 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 396 (1999).
121. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76, at 4 (citing Victor Streib, Death Sen-
tences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1973-October 1998, at 3, 4, tbl.1 (last
modified Oct. 31, 1998) <http:www.law.onu.edu/faculty/Streib/juvdeath.pdf>).
122. See id. at 12 (listing The Convention on the Rights of the Child, The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and The
American Convention on Human Rights).
[Vol. 50:143
2000] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 163
if the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty can be regarded as cus-
tomary international law, a premise to which strong opposition exists;'23
the frameworks proposed by Domingues and the Committee fail to rec-
ognize a doctrine that exempts the United States from the prohibition:
the "persistent objector doctrine.', 24 In order to preserve the values of
consent and state sovereignty, under the "persistent objector doctrine,"
some states may be exempt from customary laws that otherwise bind
other states. 125
To be recognized as a persistent objector, a state must continually and
consistently object to the attempted enforcement of a specific interna-
126tional norm. Under this doctrine, even if the prohibition of the execu-
tion of minors is customary international law, the norm would only bind
the United States if it has not continually and consistently objected to the
127norm.
Although the persistent objector doctrine is generally accepted as le-
128gitimate, states have rarely sought protection under the doctrine. 9
Consequently, there is little case law shedding light on how the doctrine
123. See generally Kallins, supra note 87, at 93-98. Kallins argues that depending upon
how one interprets "wide spread" and gathers consensus on each state's penal code, the
prohibition on the juvenile death penalty may not qualify as a state practice. Id. (noting
that some judges have interpreted "wide spread" as requiring unanimity). Kallins also ar-
gues that the opinio juris argument lacks support because "neither U.S. legislatures nor
courts articulate an express reliance on international norms in setting a minimum age at
which the death penalty may be imposed." Id. at 97.
124. See generally General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86 (making no mention
of the persistent objector doctrine); Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76 (also making no
mention of the persistent objector doctrine).
125. Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Cus-
tomary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1986). Charney attributes the
rise of the persistent objector doctrine in part to Western States and their fear that inter-
national law is evolving in a way that clashes with Western values, See id. As such, the
persistent objector rule serves as a safety valve for these nations. See id. Charney also
notes that the doctrine reflects an emphasis on state sovereignty and the idea that a state
should only be bound to that which it expressly consents. See id.
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. d ("[I]n principle a dissenting state which indicates its dissent from a
practice while the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule of law
even after it matures.").
127. See Loschin, supra note 58, at 169-71 (applying a persistent objector analysis to
the United States and its approach to the juvenile death penalty).
128. See Charney, supra note 125, at 2 (revealing that "virtually all authorities main-
tain that a State which objects to an evolving rule of general customary international law
can be exempted from its obligations").
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. d (pointing out that the persistent objector doctrine has rarely been ap-
plied).
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should be applied. 3 1 With limited exceptions, however, most evidence
indicates that the United States has consistently and continually recog-
nized the legitimacy of executing minors and thus should qualify as a per-
sistent objector. 3'
Domestically, the majority of American state legislatures that retain
the death penalty also retain the penalty for juvenile offenders.'32 Al-
though the Supreme Court's Thompson decision prevents states from
executing offenders who were younger than sixteen at the time of their
crime, the Court has never fully banned all executions of juvenile offend-'33
ers. Indeed, the execution of juvenile offenders has been an ever-
present element in the U.S. judicial system since well before the 1700s. '
3
The United States has ratified only one treaty that has restricted its
execution of juvenile offenders. 13' That treaty, however, placed limita-
tions on the penalty only in a wartime context. 36 Outside of this very
specific and limited exception, the United States has not ratified a single
treaty that has restricted its ability to execute juvenile offenders. 137 Fur-
thermore, the United States has opposed efforts to include anti-death
penalty provisions in more than one treaty, including the ICCPR.
13
1
130. See Loschin, supra note 58, at 152 (noting that only two International Court of
Justice decisions discuss the persistent objector doctrine).
131. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing An-
glo-American sources and case law from before and after the writing of the Constitution
that supports the legitimacy of the juvenile death penalty); see generally Gasparini, supra
note 4 (detailing the United States's long history of juvenile executions).
132. See Juvenile Offenders (last updated 08/09/99) <http://www.agitator.com/dp/ juve-
niles/index.html> (revealing that of the 38 states in which the death penalty is legal, 24
permit the execution of minors).
133. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (describing that Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) upheld a Kentucky statute that allowed the execution of juve-
niles who were at least 16 years old at the time of their crimes).
134. See generally, e.g., Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children. The American
Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36
OKLA. L. REV. 613 (1983) (describing the United States and its long history of using the
death penalty to punish juvenile offenders).
135. See Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 286 [hereinafter Geneva Wartime Conven-
tion]. One scholar has asserted that a state's reluctance to ratify a treaty amounts to a re-
jection of the treaty. See Kallins, supra note 87, at 97.
136. See generally Geneva Wartime Convention, supra note 135, arts. 68 & 75 (pro-
hibiting the execution of prisoners of war who are under the age of 18).
137. See Nanda, supra note 4, at 1330 (pointing out that the Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is the only treaty ratified by the
United States that prohibits the execution of minors); see also Loschin, supra note 58, at
169 (concluding that except for the Fourth Geneva Wartime Convention, the United
States has not bound itself to any international treaty that prohibits the death penalty).
138. See Case 9647, INTER-AM. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 260, 284 (1987) (stating that the
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Thus, even if the ICCPR provision that prohibits the execution of juve-
nile offenders is customary law-consequently a provision related to the
ICCPR's "object and purpose" according to the Human Rights Commit-
tee-as a persistent objector, the U.S. reservation is valid. 3'
D. Using Non-Derogeable Status to Identify Provisions That Are Related
to a Treaty's "Object and Purpose"
Although the Human Rights Committee advocated a customary inter-
national law analysis to determine if an ICCPR provision pertains to the
treaty's overall purpose, a portion of the Committee's General Commento. • • 140
maintained that another test may also be useful, though not definitive.
This portion of the General Comment asserted that resolution of what
constitutes an invalid reservation will be clarified if provisions are di-
vided into derogeable and non-derogeable categories. 141
Non-derogeable provisions are provisions designated by treaty makers
to be "so fundamental and so essential that they brook no exception,
even in emergency situations. 1 42 Once parties ratify a treaty, they are
bound to the treaty's non-derogeable provisions regardless of what cir-
cumstances might arise subsequent to the treaty's ratification. 143  From
the perspective of some committee members, non-derogeable provisions
United States opposed the death penalty restrictions included in the American Conven-
tion and the ICCPR); see also Kallins, supra note 87, at 99-100 (providing a thorough his-
tory of the United States's opposition to Article 4 of the ICCPR).
139. See Case 9647, supra note 138, at 298, para. 54 (holding that because the United
States has protested the norm prohibiting juvenile death penalty, it is not bound by the
norm even if it were found to exist).
140. General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, para. 10 ("While there is no auto-
matic correlation between reservations to non-derogeable provisions, and reservations
which offend against the object and purpose of the Covenant, a State has a heavy onus to
justify such a reservation.").
141. Id. An advisory opinion from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
supports the use of non-derogeable provisions to decipher the essential provisions that
preserve a treaty's object and purpose. See Sherman, supra note 78, at 79. When ruling on
the Guatemalan death penalty reservation, the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights declared that because the right to life was designated as non-derogeable, it is in-
compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and consequently, not permit-
ted. See id. (citing Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Con-
vention on Human Rights); Advisory Opinion No. OC-3183 of Sept. 8, 1983, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 3 (1983), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 320, 341
(1984)). While the Human Rights Committee recognizes a link between the ICCPR's
purpose and non-derogeable provisions, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights sug-
gests that the two are analytically equivalent. See id.
142. Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 293.
143. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 4 (describing what non-derogation entails in the
context of ICCPR provisions).
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are necessarily related to a treaty's "object and purpose. 144 This argu-
ment assumes that if treaty makers willingly designate certain provisions
as permitting no permutation or exception upon ratification, then surely
these treaty makers recognize the same provisions as so integral to a
treaty's overall purpose that they bar reservation.
4
1
Because the U.S. reservations to ICCPR death penalty provisions were
designated as non-derogeable, this approach would certainly be advanta-
geous to defendants in Domingues's position.44 This approach, however,
overlooks the fact that treaty makers designate many provisions as non-
derogeable for reasons unrelated to their general importance.' 47  The
Human Rights Committee and other international organizations have
pointed out that some provisions are designated as non-derogeable sim-
ply because their suspension would be irrelevant to a state maintaining
power in a crisis situation, not because the provision's importance war-
rants no exception. 48 Other provisions are non-derogeable because they
cannot be enforced or controlled.9 Because non-derogeable status may
signify varying objectives, non-derogeable provisions are not necessarily
related to a treaty's "object and purpose."'5 ° Therefore, the fact that the
United States attached reservations to non-derogeable provisions indi-
cates little about the validity of these reservations.''
144. Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 294.
145. See id. Other arguments, however, do not suggest that such an inference is neces-
sary and instead assert that by its very definition, a non-derogeable provision does not al-
low reservations. See Sherman, supra note 78, at 70 (declaring that U.S. death penalty res-
ervations are "contrary to Article 5's nonderogable language").
146. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 4(1)-(2) (noting that articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1
& 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18 do not allow derogation even in times of public emergencies). In
his dissent in Domingues, Justice Rose cited the non-derogeable provision in Article 6 as
authority supporting the position that the United States's reservation was invalid. Domin-
gues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Nev. 1998) (Rose, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 396 (1999).
147. See General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, at 465, para. 10.
148. See id. (listing Articles 10 & 11, which forbid imprisonment for debt, as examples
of non-derogeable provisions that are designated as such because they are unrelated to the
control of a state during an emergency situation).
149. See id. (providing the ICCPR's freedom of conscience protection as an example
of a provision that has been designated as non-derogeable simply because it is unenforce-
able).
150. Id. While noting that using non-derogeable status to identify vital provisions is
overinclusive, the Committee also pointed out that it is underinclusive in some circum-
stances. See id. The Committee pointed out that "not all rights of profound importance,
such as articles 9 and 27 of the Covenant, have in fact been made non-derogeable." Id.
151. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 76, at 13.
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AN INVALID RESERVATION: SEVERABLE OR
NON-SEVERABLE?
If a U.S. court were to hold that the United States's reservation to the
ICCPR provision is invalid, the consequences of such a holding would be
unclear.15 It is possible that the United States would remain a party to
the ICCPR and maintain the benefit of the reservation, despite its inva-
lidity.'53 It is possible that the United States would lose its status as a
party to the ICCPR, which would allow the country to execute juvenile
offenders but prevent it from using the ICCPR as a way to influence the
114
human rights practices of other countries. It is also possible that the
United States would be bound by the ICCPR provisions to which the
country attached its invalid reservations.55
Traditionally, international authorities have advocated a contract
analysis to determine the appropriate response to an invalid reserva-
tion."' Under the contract analysis of treaty reservations, codified by the
Vienna Convention, if a party protests that a state's reservation is inva-
152. Compare Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, at 423-24, para. 5
(declaring that invalid reservations are not severable from a state's consent), with General
Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, para. 18 (stating that invalid reservations are sever-
able from a state's consent).
153. See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 20, para. 4(b).
154. See Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Nev. 1998) (Rose, J., dissenting)
(citing Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 318-19, and declaring that "[i]f the
reservation was a 'sine qua non' of the acceptance of the whole treaty by the United
States, then the United State's [sic] ratification of the treaty could be considered a nul-
lity"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 396 (1999).
155. See id. (Rose, J., dissenting) (recognizing that if the United States made invalid
reservations, it may be bound by provisions to which it placed reservations). Rose stated
that "if the United States has shown an intent to accept the treaty as a whole, the result
could be that the United States is bound by all of the provisions of the treaty, notwith-
standing the reservation." Id. (Rose, J., dissenting) (citing Schabas, Invalid Reservations,
supra note 8, at 318-19). Domingues needed to establish that in light of an invalid reserva-
tion by the Senate, the United States should be bound to the entire ICCPR without the
benefit of any reservations. See id. (Rose, J., dissenting).
156. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984)
("A treaty is in the nature of a contract."); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed.) (1952) ("A treaty, like a con-
tract, is a legal transaction by which the contracting parties intend to establish mutual ob-
ligations and rights."); MCNAIR, supra note 84, at 105 (admitting that while the analogy
between treaties and contracts is sometimes overemphasized, it is nonetheless true that "in
solving the problems to which the practice of attaching reservations to the signature or
ratification of treaties give rise, the analogy [to treaties] has been found useful").
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lid,'57 treaty members will recognize the reserving state in one of two
ways. ]
A. Bound with the Benefit of Reservation
Under Article 20(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention, a state that objects
to another state's reservation may voice its opposition to the reservation,
but still permit the treaty, minus the provisions to which objectionable
reservations have been attached, to bind both states.'59 If an objecting
state chooses to employ this mild form of sanction,' 6° then neither the re-
serving state nor the objecting state can hold the other responsible for• 161
any of the provisions upon which reservations have been placed. This
creates a situation in which both the reserving and objecting states have
the same reciprocal treaty obligations.' 2  Thus, for the reserving state,
the practical consequence of employing this type of sanction is the same
as if the reservation was simply accepted. In both cases, the reserving
state is regarded as a party to the treaty and is not bound by the provi-
sions to which it placed reservations. The only difference is that by
157. Not all parties objected to the United States's reservations. See Sherman, supra
note 78, at 72. To the contrary, only 11 of well over 100 states objected to U.S. reserva-
tions. See id. If a state accepts another country's reservation, then the treaty, less the res-
ervations, takes effect between the two nations and both parties are bound by reciprocal
obligations. See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 20, para. 4. A state may accept a
reservation through either explicit or tacit consent. See id. art. 20, paras. 4-5. If a state
does not object to a reservation within 12 months of when it was made, then the state is
judged to have accepted the reservation. See id. art. 20, para. 5.
158. See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 20, para. 4. An objecting state may
oppose another state's reservation either with or without an attached statement that ex-
plicitly precludes the treaty from entering into force between the objecting state and the
reserving state. See id.
159. Id. art. 20, para. 4(b).
160. See id. (allowing objecting states to prevent a treaty from taking effect between
themselves and a reserving state).
161. See id. art. 21, paras. 1 (a)-(b).
162. See id. art. 21, para. 1(a) (allowing a state to change its obligations through reser-
vations). Article 21, para. (1)(b) notes that any changes modify "those provisions to the
same extent for that other party (the one that accepts the reservations) in its relations with
the reserving State." Id. art. 21, para. (1)(b). Although the obligations between reserving
and objecting states may change, a "reservation does not modify the provisions of the
treaty for the other parties to the treaty [inter se]." Id. art. 21, para. (2).
163. See Hylton, supra note 81, at 433 (citing debates from the drafters of the Vienna
Convention in 20 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 277, 290-91 (1977)). If the reserving state is able
to become a treaty party and not comply with the provisions to which it attached reserva-
tions, it is questionable whether the objecting state really "objected" in any meaningful
way. Id. Because the objecting state allows the reservation to be recognized, in practice
its "objection" may be better classified as an inconsequential "declaration." Id.
164. See id. at 433. That reserving states have been allowed this type of flexibility has
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objecting under Article 20(4)(b), states have the opportunity to express
their disapproval and pressure the reserving state into accepting the full
treaty.165
B. Prohibiting the Treaty Participation of Reserving States
Instead of creating reciprocal obligations under Article 20, Article 19
allows the objecting state to reject the reservation and not allow the
treaty to come into effect at all between itself and the reserving state. 
166
In effect, this type of sanction prevents the reserving state and objecting
state from making any treaty demands of each other.16' The objecting
state, however, lacks the power to prevent other states from recognizing
the reserving state as a legitimate treaty member. 16' Because the Vienna
Convention permits each objecting party to apply sanctions according to
either Article 19 or Article 20, a single treaty may contain different
treaty obligations between different nations. 
69
C. Invalid Reservations as Severable
Although the Human Rights Committee ostensibly relies on the
been widely criticized. See, e.g., SINCLAIR, supra note 90, at 50. Sinclair states that:
The assumed advantage of a more flexible reservations regime is that it will en-
courage a larger number of States to become parties to multilateral Conventions;
but this advantage will be more than counterbalanced if the effect of the greater
liberality is to destroy, or to undermine, the fundamental basis of the treaty it-
self."
Id.
165. See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, arts. 19 & 20; MCNAIR, supra note 84, at
106.
166. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 20, para. 4(b).
167. See id.
168. See generally id. arts. 19-20. The Vienna Convention recognizes only one circum-
stance in which the objection of a single state may prevent a reservation from being ac-
cepted by other states. Id. art. 20, para. 3. Unanimous consent is not required when there
is both a "limited number" of negotiating states and a reservation that is contrary to the
"object and purpose" of the treaty in question. Id. art. 20, para. 2. Putting the "object and
purpose" question aside, because well over 100 countries signed the ICCPR-far from a
"limited number,"-it is clear that this exception does not apply in the context of the
ICCPR. See supra note 157.
169. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, at 433; see Hylton, supra note 81, at 433. Hyl-
ton illustrates this situation with a three-party hypothetical in which a state makes reserva-
tions that one party accepts, but another party rejects. See id. If the accepting and reject-
ing parties share treaty obligations between themselves, all three parties may be subject to
the same treaty and, yet, owe each other completely different obligations. See id. This
system has been criticized for jeopardizing "certainty on a fundamental aspect of the law
of treaties: the identity of the parties." GORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (George W. Keeton & Gorg Schwarzenberger eds., 5th ed.
1967).
Catholic University Law Review
authority of the Vienna Convention in its determinations of what consti-
tutes an invalid reservation, 70 the Human Rights Committee dismisses
the Vienna Convention's two alternatives for handling an invalid reser-
vation. ' Contrary to the Vienna Convention, the Committee states that
an invalid reservation "will generally be severable, in the sense that the
Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without the benefit of
the reservation.
' 172
To explain this derivation from the Vienna Convention, the Human
Rights Committee argues that the unique character of human rights trea-
ties is not well suited for a flexible system of accommodating treaty res-• 173
ervations. The Committee argues, therefore, that in human rights trea-
ties "[tlhe principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place."1 4 Although
the Committee does not cite any other authority or precedent that sup-
ports binding a state to a provision to which consent has been explicitly
withheld scholar William Schabas has drawn attention to a case that
arguably supports the Committee's conclusions.
1 76
In Loizidou v. Turkey,77 the European Court of Human Rights ruled
on the validity of a Turkish reservation to the European Convention.'
The Court held that the Vienna Convention's "object and purpose" test
rendered Turkey's reservation invalid. In determining the conse
quences of Turkey's invalid reservation, the Court sought to ascertain
170. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing how the Committee
adopted and added to the Vienna Convention's "object and purpose" test).
171. See General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 86, para. 17. In the Human Rights
Committee's opinion, "the operation of the classic rules on reservations is... inadequate."
Id. para. 8.
172. Id. para. 18.
173. See id. para. 17 (stating that with respect to the consequences of an invalid reser-
vation, the Vienna Convention framework is inadequate because human rights treaties
"are not a web on inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations").
174. Id.
175. See generally id.
176. See Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 313-14 (explaining that the
European Court of Human Rights, through its decision in Loizidou v. Turkey, 131 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1988), has put new life into the consequences of invalid treaty reservations).
177. 131 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (ruling that Turkey was bound by treaty provi-
sions restricting its activity in Northern Cyprus, despite the fact that Turkey had attached
treaty reservations to those provisions).
178. See id. para. 89. The case involved a Greek Cypriot applicant, Loizidou, who
charged that Turkish troops had prohibited her from returning to her home in Northern
Cyprus. See id. para. 11. Loizidou charged that the Turkish police violated her rights un-
der the European Convention on Human Rights, which Turkey had ratified. See id. para.
15. Turkey responded that it had placed reservations on the provisions under which Lo-
izidou based her claim. See id. para. 17.
179. Id. para. 89.
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whether Turkey conditioned its consent to the treaty upon not being.. 180
bound by the provisions to which it attached reservations....
When Turkey ratified the European Convention, it explicitly con-
sented to the authority of the European Court of Human Rights to 'hear
and settle all disputes concerning its reservations."" The Court con-
cluded that this demonstrated Turkey's intent to be bound by all fore-
seeable decisions of the Court, which included the possibility that the
Court would find Turkey's reservations invalid and declare those invalid
reservations as severable. 82 The Court concluded that Turkey foresaw
these results, and that Turkey's reservations were not so essential that
without them the country would have withheld its consent to the treaty.1 83
Although Turkey expressed an unwillingness to be bound without the
benefit of its declarations, the European Court disregarded this evidence
because it came after Turkey agreed to be bound by the Court's deter-
minations.'4 Thus, Loizidou does not support the position that interna-
tional courts are willing to bind states beyond what those states in-
tended.
Unlike the facts in Loizidou, there is no indication that the United
States foresaw any treaty body ruling on whether its reservations to the
ICCPR were severable or non-severable."' Moreover, the United States
has explicitly stated, before and after the objections of other states, that
its reservations constitute integral parts of its consent to the ICCPR and
180. See id. para. 90 (stating that in order for Loizidou to prevail, it had to be shown
that Turkey's reservations were not an essential basis for its consent).
181. See id. para. 27. Turkey recognized "as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement [to] the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in all matters con-
cerning the interpretation and application of the Convention ..... Id. para. 27.
182. See id. para. 95 (concluding that Turkey had indicated a "willingness on her part
to run the risk that the limitation clauses at issue would be declared invalid by the Conven-
tion['s] institutions without affecting the validity of the declarations themselves").
183. See id.
184. See id. ("The Court does not consider that the issue of the severability of the in-
valid parts of Turkey's declarations can be decided by reference to the statements of her
representatives expressed subsequent to the filing of the declarations.").
185. See Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 322 (admitting that "[t]he
European Court did not set aside the test of intention in determining whether a reserva-
tion is severable").
186. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (describing how the United States
and other nations did not consent to the power of the Human Rights Committee). While
the United States recognized the authority of the Human Rights Committee to listen to
disputes between nations, it also stated that under the language of the ICCPR, "[t]he
Committee can exercise this authority only if both Parties-the complaining State and the
State which is the object of the complaint-recognize the Committee's competence."
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 23, at 651.
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simply cannot be ignored.8 7 Given these stark factual differences, Loizi-
dou does not support the Human Rights Committee's attempt to con-
vince U.S. courts that the ICCPR juvenile death penalty provision binds
the United States despite the country's reservation.'
8
V. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Although the ICCPR empowers the Human Rights Committee to
monitor the compliance of parties to the Convention, the ICCPR does
not permit the Human Rights Committee to speak with absolute author-
ity on the issue of treaty reservations.9 The Committee claims to re-
ceive its powers from Article 40, yet Article 40 only allows the Commit-
tee to attach comments to the compliance reports of contracting states.' 9°
The Covenant does not designate these comments as binding, and as
such, Article 40 should be read as granting the Committee nothing more
than advisory power. 1
In the absence of a recognized body responsible for determining the
validity of reservations, the Vienna Convention places the responsibility
on the individual states that are parties to the ICCPR.'9 ' Although this
will admittedly splinter treaty agreements, '93 this approach is consistent
with the plain language of the ICCPR and presumably with the intent of
those states that have ratified the treaty.'94 In the complete absence of
187. See Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, at 424.
188. See supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
189. See Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 315-16 (ceding that "[s]tates
that ratify the Covenant only undertake to submit periodic reports to the Committee, and
this implies little more than a dialogue or exchange of information and views between the
Committee and state party").
190. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 40, para. 4.
191. Id. art. 40; see John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1294 (1993) (noting that the
"Covenant does not require a state to comply with the view of the Committee"); Schabas,
Invalid Reservations, supra note 8, at 315 (recognizing that "on a strict reading of the
Covenant, nothing that the Committee says is really 'binding' upon states parties"); Stew-
art, supra note 79, at 1188 (noting that the Committee has "no enforcement power").
192. See Sherman, supra note 78, at 84 (stating that the Vienna Convention allows
states to consider individually whether another state's reservation is valid or invalid).
193. See generally Genocide Convention Case, supra note 84, at 45-46 (Guerrero,
McNair, Read, and Hsu Mo, JJ., dissenting) (expressing their fear that while a flexible ap-
proach may increase treaty participation, it may also reduce the treaty's significance be-
cause states will be able to avert the treaty's most reformative provisions).
194. See Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, para. 1 (stating that it
would be "a rather significant departure from the Covenant scheme" to infer that the
Human Rights Committee has the competence to rule on whether a reservation violates
the ICCPR's object and purpose).
[Vol. 50:143
20001 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 173
ICCPR provisions that would clarify the issue,95 each state should be free
to determine its own criteria for accepting or rejecting a state's reserva-
tion as contrary to the ICCPR's "object and purpose."' 96
Should an objecting state not recognize another state's reservation, the
state placing the reservation should not be regarded as bound by provi-
sions to which it has not consented.'9 Objecting states should be limited
to either rejecting the reserving state altogether or accepting the reserv-
ing state as a treaty party that deserves criticism, but is nonetheless ex-
empt from specified provisions.'9 8 To allow objecting states powers be-
yond this is to reject the basic principles of self-determination that
underlie the ICCPR and the principles of consent that govern interna-
tional treaty law.'99
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of customary international law or standards as an interpretive
tool for the Eighth Amendment will not be accepted by positivist juris-
prudence of the current Supreme Court. Though the ICCPR ostensibly
provides new opportunities for positivist arguments against the death
penalty, reservations protect the United States from being forced to alter
the status of its juvenile death penalty practices. Even if the Vienna
Convention's "object and purpose" test for reservations is adopted, the
ICCPR posits individual states as the appropriate authorities for apply-
ing this test. As a persistent objector to international efforts to ban the
death penalty, no state or U.S. court should rule that the United States is
in violation of the ICCPR's "object and purpose." If, in the extreme
case, states disregard the United States's persistent objector status, those
states are empowered to reject the United States as a party to the
195. See supra note 98.
196. Sherman, supra note 78, at 84 ("[The Vienna Convention] provides no definitive
method for determining when a reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty. Rather, it allows states to judge incompatibility individually.").
197. See Genocide Convention Case, supra note 84, at 20 ("It is well established that in
its treaty relations a State cannot be bound [against any state] without its consent.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 re-
porters's note 2 (1986) (declaring that "international law essentially depends on the con-
sent of states"); Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, para. 5 (noting that the
fundamental principle of treaties is that "obligation is based on consent").
198. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 71, arts. 19-20.
199. See Observations by the Governments, supra note 108, para. 5 ("A state which
does not consent to a treaty is not bound by that treaty."); Ginger, supra note 65, at 1383
(noting that the Human Rights Committee has emphasized the value of self-
determination); Sherman, supra note 78, at 963 ("Treaty law consists of expressly accepted
obligations spelled out in international agreements freely adhered to by states.").
174 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 50:143
ICCPR. Objecting states, however, are not empowered, through the
authority of the Human Rights Committee, to bind the United States to
provisions from which it has explicitly withheld its consent. Thus, despite
the temptation, U.S. courts should not overturn the death sentences
given to juvenile offenders by relying on the United States's purported
commitments under the ICCPR.
